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Introduction 
In the second half of 2017, as the civil war abated and the so-
called Islamic State (IS) was all but defeated, Moscow 
increased its efforts to reach what it regards as conflict 
resolution in several fora beyond the UN-led Geneva process. 
Moreover, as the US administration made it clear that it 
would not be engaging in reconstruction efforts, Russia has 
sought European financial assistance to help cover the costs 
of rebuilding the country, together with Arab Gulf states. 
Although the European Union had, in April 2017, ruled out 
support for reconstruction without a political transition, calls 
have now been mounting in Europe to accommodate Bashar 
al-Asad, help in the reconstruction of Syria, and send back 
refugees. Yet, the fighting is far from over. More 
importantly, the mere reconstruction of physical 
infrastructure would do little to instill stability, but would 
rather raise the risk of fueling new conflicts. Europeans 
should therefore make clear to Russia that they will stick with 
their own approach. They should play the long game and 
develop leverage to make future contributions serve state- 
and peace-building purposes. Meanwhile, they should focus 
on increased levels of humanitarian aid, early recovery 
measures, such as de-mining and restoring basic water and 
health infrastructure, building human capital in Syria and 
among Syrian refugee communities, in addition to 
concentrating on civil society and local governance support 
where they have credible partners.  
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A New Phase of the Conflict 
By late 2017, the Syrian regime and its allies had regained 
control over most of the urban centers in the country, and the 
Caliphate proclaimed by the IS had all but lost its territorial 
base. The rebels had been mainly squeezed into several 
pockets but were still holding onto strategic junctures and 
main border crossings.2 At the same time, ever since its direct 
military involvement in Syria, Russia has developed into the 
dominant military force. Moscow has been keen to translate 
that achievement into taking the lead on the diplomatic stage 
and acting as mediator in the conflict. Washington, whose 
interest in Syria since 2014 has been limited largely to 
combating the IS, has been unwilling to challenge the 
Russian approach. Nor has it shown willingness to contribute 
meaningfully to Syria’s reconstruction after its heavy 
bombing of Syria’s east. Russian bombardment, especially of 
Aleppo in 2016, caused wide-scale destruction, drawing 
strong EU condemnation for the “deliberate targeting of 
hospitals, medical personnel, schools and essential 
infrastructure” (Emmott, 2016). Yet, Moscow has turned to 
Europe for reconstruction support while chiding European 
countries for linking reconstruction to a political transition 
and predicted the conflict would soon be over. De-escalation 
was portrayed as having created the “de facto conditions” for 
full-scale reconstruction in Syria. Today’s reality, however, 
looks different, with control still very much fragmented 
between a variety of forces on the ground in the deescalation 
zones, the territories liberated from the IS, the areas 
controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), as 
well as those areas under the control of the regime and its 
allies – with the fighting doing anything but drawing to a 
close.  
 
De-escalation Zones  
Moscow first used its military backing mainly to help the 
regime and its allies reconquer territories. Over the course of 
2017, it aimed at reducing the levels of violence through a 
new approach that was to prepare the ground for pacification. 
In this vein, in the Kazakhstani capital, Astana, in May 2017, 
Russia agreed with Turkey and Iran on so-called de-
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escalation zones in regions held by various rebel forces. The 
deal was supposed to result in a halt to fighting in places 
where the revolt had not been crushed, offering the 
possibility of sustained humanitarian relief and the 
restoration of basic services.  
The Russia–Iran–Turkey deal stipulated ceasefires in 
four de-escalation zones, the halt of airstrikes, “rapid, safe, 
and unhindered” humanitarian access, the restoration of 
basic infrastructure, and the creation of conditions for the 
voluntary return of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The 
fight against jihadists would still continue in the zones, with 
attacks on the IS and HTS, an al-Qaeda offshoot, being 
exempted from the ceasefires. The zones comprise: 1. the 
north: Idlib province and parts of Aleppo, Latakia, and Hama 
governorates on the border with Turkey; 2. Homs: rural areas 
north of the city of Homs; 3. the Eastern Ghouta, i.e., the 
eastern suburbs of Damascus; and 4. a southwestern zone in 
areas adjacent to Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan 
Heights. Out of the four zones, the Damascus and Homs 
zones in the center of the country have been besieged by the 
regime. The three guarantors were to deploy military 
observers to see through the implementation of the ceasefire 
agreements (Syria’s de-escalation zones explained, 2017). 
In reality, the zones have evolved to present an array of 
local situations: from improved living conditions to the 
continued siege and massive carnage caused by the regime’s 
and Russia’s bombings of civilian targets in areas that 
Moscow had marked as being part of the de-escalation 
zones. For Asad, the zones were considered to be a 
temporary arrangement, if at all, and were to follow the path 
of other besieged areas that the regime had captured after 
“terrorists” (which is the regime’s term for all rebels) were 
given the chance to disarm and “return to the bosom of the 
state.” By early 2018, the Eastern Ghouta and Idlib de-
escalation zones had effectively broken down. 
 
Makings of a Mini-recovery  
At the same time, bombing and sieges on areas in other zones 
abated, most notably in the countryside near Homs and in the 
southern governorate of Daraa. The window of temporary 
18    The Day After: Post-Uprising Realities & Challenges  
 
stability spurred fairly brisk activity in the private 
construction sphere. For example, some residents in rural 
Homs moved back to their hometowns from camps in nearby 
farmlands and started to repair or rebuild their houses. Mud 
is reportedly being used instead of concrete, as prices for 
construction materials imported from regime areas remain 
high. The cost of most other goods and staples, such as sugar 
and rice, has fallen since the de-escalation deal came into 
effect in August 2017, breaking the monopolies of local 
traders, who had enjoyed a captive market. Two crossings 
with the regime opened, increasing the overall level of 
supplies. An export market slowly opened, too. Rebel areas 
sent sheep and cattle to regime areas, and the number of 
farmers who planned to plant crops increased, as they 
expected large enough sales to make a profit.  
The potential of improved access could also rejuvenate 
the local councils, which activists had set up during the 
revolt to replace the regime’s administration after Asad’s 
forces withdrew from rebellious areas. The councils in rural 
Homs are now seeking to link up with donors and with the 
opposition’s interim government. At the same time, the siege 
of the region may have been a blessing in disguise for the 
local structures, isolating them from outside meddling. In the 
southern governorate of Daraa, local activists see the reach 
of Jordan and other Arab countries as having tainted local 
governance structures. Figures linked to third countries 
penetrated or took over many of the local councils, 
undermining their merit and competence.3  
 
Al-Qaeda Lurks  
Apart from continued regime bombings and the threat of the 
regime attempting to reconquer further rebel areas, the 
highest hurdles to potential reconstruction in the de-
escalation zones come from within. By August 2017, 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, or the Association for the 
Liberation of the Levant) – an offshoot of al-Qaeda and 
successor of the Nusra Front – all but finished off its Salafist 
rival, Ahrar al-Sham, and took control over most of the Idlib 
province.  
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The area of influence of HTS also included the main 
border crossing with Turkey, through which flows 
humanitarian aid and infrastructure supplies. Borrowing 
from Lenin’s dictum of “peace, land and bread,” HTS took 
over the bakeries in the various towns across Idlib, many of 
which relied on Western programs for wheat supply. Keen 
to build up legitimacy with the local population and be seen 
as succeeding in governance, HTS indicated that it would not 
prevent outside assistance to Idlib (Bulos, 2017).  
At the same time, the group had its hand in many of the 
local administrative structures, as well as schools, charities, 
and refugee camps, without necessarily staffing them 
outright with its members or conspicuously patrolling them. 
HTS also dissolved local councils or ousted council 
members who were critical of the group. In addition, they 
co-opted existing supervisory bodies, such as the Idlib 
Administrative Board, or nudged civilian allies to set up new 
ones. Among them is the so-called Syrian Salvation 
Government, formed in November 2017, with the apparent 
aim of displacing the opposition’s interim government. 
Many qualified cadres in the various local administrations of 
Idlib remained in their posts despite their distaste of HTS. 
They preferred to hold onto their jobs and their links to 
donors to keep aid deliveries going.  
Western support for Idlib’s population, in contrast, 
abated markedly after HTS’ takeover, as foreign donors 
were anxious about indirectly supporting the group or its 
front organizations. Activists had hoped that the entry of 
Turkish troops into Idlib in October 2017 would roll back 
HTS. The Turkish show of force was mandated by the 
implementation of the northern de-escalation zone foreseen 
in the Astana agreement. Yet, it was aimed at the Kurdish 
People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia, which is linked to 
the PYD, a Syrian offshoot of the Turkish Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) in the nearby region of Afrin; this was 
done with the goal of preventing a contiguous Kurdish self-
administration zone along the Turkish border.  
The risk, however, of renewed warfare in the zone 
remained high, with Turkey and Iran raising the tone of their 
assertive rhetoric. Ankara, boosted by its newfound 
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understandings with Russia, said it needed to clear Afrin of 
the YPG and started another military operation dubbed 
“olive branch” in January 2018 after the US government 
had announced it would help set up a border force manned 
by 30,000 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters. 
Earlier, in December 2018, the Asad regime had started a 
military campaign in Southern Idlib and Hama provinces, 
aimed at reconquering strategic assets from the jihadists 
there.  
The mostly Kurdish Afrin region has an estimated 
300,000 inhabitants living in 20 cities and towns, whereas 
Idlib province has an estimated two million people, of 
whom one-third have been displaced there from other 
provinces. They settled in Idlib after fleeing fighting 
elsewhere in the country because Turkey had closed its 
border to refugees. Also, thousands of rebel fighters, their 
families, and other civilians were transported to the 
province in the regime’s “green buses,” which became 
synonymous with the population transfers that 
accompanied rebel surrenders in besieged areas under so-
called reconciliation agreements.  
 
Kurdish Expansion  
Signs have emerged of an overreach by the PYD, in 
particular after the United States encouraged the capture of 
mostly Arab inhabited territories in eastern Syria from the IS 
by the SDF, which are dominated by the YPG, the PYD’s 
fighters. In addition, the PYD’s declared goal of linking two 
contiguous self-rule areas (the so-called cantons of Jazeera 
and Kobanê) with the Afrin canton also appeared to be 
farfetched. By late 2017, it became clear that the United 
States (and Russia) would not back the Syrian Kurds’ 
political ambitions against Turkey beyond combating the IS; 
nor would Russia prevent the regime from recapturing 
territories liberated from the IS.  
The PYD has set up local governance structures in these 
areas. Although these structures of “people’s democracy” 
are nominally independent and inclusive, the PYD remains 
the power behind the scenes. One such arrangement has been 
installed in the mostly Arab town of Manbij, which the YPG 
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captured from the IS in August 2016. The PYD appointed 
Farouk al-Mashi, a tribal figure, as the joint head of the 
Manbij City Council. The appointment invited scorn by 
opposition activists on social media, who compared the 
PYD’s methods of coercion and control to that of the regime. 
They also pointed out that al-Mashi was the son of Diab al-
Mashi, a member of the rubber stamp Syrian parliament 
from 1954 till his death in 2009.  
 
Pay-up Time for the Regime  
Even though the Asad regime by no means controlled the 
entirety of Syria’s territory, it sensed the winds in its favor. 
It sought to employ reconstruction to placate its 
constituencies and compensate for the thousands who had 
died fighting for Asad. At the opening of the Damascus 
International Trade Fair in August 2017, an Asad aide said 
Syria had “made a U-turn” and was on the path of rebuilding 
(Reuters, 2017). The regime portrayed reconstruction as a 
done deal and announced that no contracts would go to 
countries that had supported what it regards as terrorism.  
Domestically, the authorities indicated that the 
rebuilding effort would reward mainly Asad’s loyalists; it 
was not an attempt to mitigate the grievances that had fueled 
the revolt by addressing issues related to institutional 
legitimacy and capacity, justice, and political and social 
inclusion. At an official rally in November 2017 – held to 
mark the coup that brought Hafez al-Asad to power more 
than four decades earlier – a senior Baath Party operative 
boasted that Syria would be “built with the hands of its 
honorable sons” (SANA, 2017). The rally was held in Homs, 
from which the regime and Iran-backed militias had 
displaced hundreds of thousands of mainly Sunni inhabitants 
as they crushed the rebellion there. Of the 8 billion Syrian 
pounds ($15.5 million) that the government announced in 
July 2017 would be allocated to projects in Homs 
governorate, most of it went to Alawite and Christian 
communities as opposed to Sunni areas destroyed by regime 
bombing. 
So far, the regime has, at least on paper, awarded 
projects to its cronies and struck initial agreements with Iran 
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(Sharafedin/Francis, 2017) and Russia. The deals range from 
residential towers and a shopping center to be built on 
bulldozed homes in Damascus that had belonged to pro-
democracy demonstrators, to a cellphone license and oil 
refinery in Homs, and energy and mining concessions in 
eastern Syria. The regime apparently hopes to play the 
external powers against each other in the hopes that they will 
cough up the cash for hardcore infrastructure projects 
requiring long-term investment.  
 
International Blueprints 
As the civil war in Syria was seen as coming to an end, UN 
agencies, development organizations, and international 
finance institutions have drawn up a wealth of reconstruction 
blueprints for the country.4 According to UN estimates, 
reconstruction would cost at least $250 billion (UNOG, 
2017). What unites most of these plans is that they deal with 
reconstruction mostly as if it were a technical issue, whereas 
not much attention is being paid to the kind of governance 
system under which it is supposed to take place. Rather, a 
competent central authority oriented toward the public good 
– able and willing to engage in an equitable restoration of 
human capital and the social fabric – is just assumed.  
Also, these plans do not detail how a competitive 
business environment would be instilled – under the same 
regime that deprived most Syrians of equal opportunity for 
decades. With the courts and bureaucracy beholden to the 
kleptocracy, foreign companies have barely been able to 
operate in Syria or to win or execute major contracts without 
partnering with the ruling elites or their agents. If anyone 
who is not in league with the regime comes close to winning 
a tender, rules are arbitrarily changed and they are 
disqualified. Cartels and rackets run by the top tiers of the 
security apparatus abound. The judiciary and regulatory 
bodies are massively rigged. Ministries and the central bank 
act as private instruments for the Makhloufs, who are Asad’s 
cousins on his mother’s side. The Makhloufs and two other 
branches of the Asad family have the public tenders and 
procurement system locked up between them.  
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What is more, most of these plans assume that Syria 
would work as a unitary state and do not account for the 
fragmentation that has resulted from the civil war. The 
fluidity of local dynamics, the emergence of new power 
brokers, and militia rule are all ignored. Among the forces 
that emerged during the civil war is a new breed of crony 
capitalists, shaping the business environment and poised to 
obstruct – together with more established regime business 
figures – any reconstruction that is not in their favor. Also 
linked to the war economy are jihadists and other militia 
seeking to maximize their returns. In regime areas, organized 
crime and gang violence linked to various pro-Asad militia 
have spiked. Loyalists have targeted other loyalists in their 
quest for loot while cutting off roads and imposing tolls.  
 
Third parties’ motives  
International reconstruction blueprints also take for granted 
cooperation between third countries for the good of Syria. In 
reality, however, many of the regional and international 
players see reconstruction as a means to consolidate their 
presence in Syria in the long term and as a tool to assert their 
(vital) interests in the broader power struggles of the Middle 
East (Berti, 2017). They also tend to focus on their 
immediate interests, such as quick financial returns or 
alleviating themselves of Syrian refugees.  
The regime reportedly promised at least one Russian 
company linked to Russian security contractors a quarter of 
the oil and gas in the fields captured from the IS (Kramer, 
2017). Iran has encouraged private investment in real estate 
in Syria and signed memorandums of understanding for 
reconstruction in Aleppo as well as the restoration of mobile 
communications, which would bring in revenues and give 
them a surveillance edge. Ankara, officially shut out by the 
regime, has repaired basic infrastructure, schools, and a 
hospital in the Turkish-controlled enclave of al-Bab (Khatib, 
2017). Along with the more crucial absence of airstrikes, the 
rehabilitation has contributed to the return of some of the 
population into the small enclave. China has said it would 
also get involved in reconstruction, but it has not provided 
any specifics.  
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The European Union and the United States have 
invested billions of dollars in humanitarian aid and 
stabilization in opposition-held areas. The Europeans see 
their work in Syria as being different from that of the 
Americans, in that they generally aim at building 
streamlined institutions across a multitude of regions and 
support civil society, whereas the United States prefers to 
work with individual actors to set up and test organizations 
that would act as a role model to be followed in other areas.  
 
Outlook, Risks, and Dilemmas for the EU  
Under various short- to mid-term scenarios (Mejnders/van 
der Lijn/ van Mierlo, 2017), the violence is not expected to 
halt, and militia rule and the war economy are set to remain 
entrenched. Still, European policymakers are under pressure 
to focus on what can be done immediately to help foster a 
settlement and stabilize the region, not least in view of the 
urgency they feel due to rising populism in the EU and the 
pressure to repatriate refugees.  
Asad will happily take more freebies from the EU. For 
the regime, reconstruction is to serve, first and foremost, its 
own consolidation as well as ensure the permanence of 
social and demographic shifts and strengthen the loyalty of 
its citizens. A view espoused by the Asad regime and echoed 
in international aid meetings warns that Europe will lose out 
to Moscow and Tehran unless European nations help in the 
reconstruction of Syria.  
In April 2017, the EU ruled out engaging in 
reconstruction “until a comprehensive, genuine and 
inclusive political transition … is firmly under way” 
(European Council, 2017). Still, in practice, the European 
approach has been inconsistent – European countries have 
financed UN rebuilding programs that work in collaboration 
with the regime. The programs are ongoing or slated to start 
in regions where the dust has barely settled on forced 
population transfers, such as in Homs. No safeguards were 
devised to ensure the right of return for the original 
inhabitants, the halt of the falsification of public records, or 
a reversal of the regime’s confiscation of property in rebel 
districts it had captured. Also, the EU has not made the 
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departure of Asad a precondition for engaging in 
reconstruction efforts. Rather, EU member states’ 
representatives have increasingly acknowledged that Bashar 
al-Asad might well play a role in the transition period, and 
even beyond. EU member states have been divided between 
those taking a stance against any cooperation with what they 
regard as a regime that cannot be reformed, and those willing 
to placate Asad in the hope of quick stabilization or of 
opening a supposedly lucrative reconstruction market to 
their companies and development agencies. Consequently, 
the EU has shied away from spelling out if a genuine 
transition would be possible if Asad and his immediate 
entourage were to remain in power.  
Reconstruction thus poses a dilemma for the EU and its 
member states, as the chances for any real change to Syria’s 
authoritarian and repressive system are fading. Indeed, the 
Russian approach and the emergence of an emboldened 
Asad regime have complicated the realization of a European 
strategy on reconstruction. Moscow has portrayed its 
activities as being complementary to the UN Special 
Envoy’s efforts at achieving a negotiated conflict settlement 
based on the 2012 Geneva Agreement and UN Security 
Council Resolution 2254 of December 2015. But the 
Russian way has undermined the approach and list of 
priorities agreed upon in Resolution 2254 (UNSC, 2015), the 
centerpiece of which was supposed to be a transitional 
governing body – comprised of regime and opposition 
representatives – with full authority. Rather, Russia has 
sought legitimization of the Asad regime by leading a 
process of limited reform legitimized by a Conference of the 
Syrian Peoples or national dialogue conference held in late 
January 2018, followed by elections.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
The Russian-dominated conflict-settlement approach and 
the expected continued presence of Iran-backed militias is 
unlikely to bring about even a minimum of the security, 
administrative, and economic reforms that would address 
Syria’s deep-rooted socio-economic and sectarian 
imbalances. Reconstruction cannot, as Russia implies, be 
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reduced to the physical reconstruction of infrastructure and 
economic recovery. Rather, measures to safeguard citizens’ 
security, establish effective governance, and lay the ground 
for reconciliation are key for peace-building.  
Experts widely agree that the following conditions need 
to be fulfilled to allow for reconstruction that serves 
peacebuilding: 1. an effective division of power with 
functioning checks and balances; the establishment of 
effective economic and administrative oversight bodies; 2. 
large-scale demilitarization; an end to militia and warlord 
rule; establishing army and security services loyal to the 
state and its citizenry, not to the regime; comprehensive 
disarmament of militias; 3. addressing forced displacement 
and expropriation of property; allowing for social 
reconciliation; 4. an inclusive constitutional process in 
which majority and minority rights are respected; a political 
climate in which free and fair elections are possible, political 
rights are guaranteed, and civil society can operate. 
In the absence of reforms leading to such favorable 
circumstances, European involvement in reconstruction runs 
the risk of feeding destructive dynamics and foregoing 
incentives for political settlement (Heller, 2017). The 
Europeans should therefore stick to the approach outlined in 
the April 2017 strategy, and clearly say so. They should also 
gauge when to throw around their weight and leverage their 
diplomatic, financial, and technical support to achieve 
conditions under which reconstruction would serve long-
term stabilization rather than lead to renewed violent conflict 
and radicalization.  
At a later stage – and because of the sheer amount of 
investment needed – the regime will not be able to depend 
only on its allies, as it has boasted. Rather, it might be forced 
to turn to Western, Gulf, and international sources of 
financing. That might be the starting point for pushing 
toward the realization of measures aimed at building credible 
institutions. One should not exaggerate the chances of 
success (Heydemann, 2017): Such a development is by no 
means guaranteed, as the regime might choose to continue 
defying European conditionality, even if it comes at the cost 
of massive North Korean-style human suffering.  
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In the near future, some of the de-escalation zones could 
become the settings for larger European efforts at recovery 
– under the condition that the arrangements stick, which is 
more likely for some areas (in the south and north of Homs) 
than for others (Eastern Ghouta and Idlib). The challenge in 
these zones is that some of the areas are controlled by forces 
that cannot be partners in reconstruction, such as al-Qaeda 
linked groups, meaning that support can only be 
administered through civil society organizations rather than 
the local councils and the interim government. Also, the 
rebels are often so fragmented in terms of actual control that 
no zone-wide de-escalation projects can be administered. 
Europeans will therefore have to look for tailor-made 
approaches, depending on the conditions and partners 
available in each of the areas. These approaches should focus 
on humanitarian aid, early recovery, and support for non-
violent community-based organizations – not least to 
counter jihadists’ propaganda and influence – as well as 
continued support for local governance, where possible. It is 
far-fetched to believe that with such kinds of support, one 
would be able to create “islands of stability,” which could be 
the basis for nation-wide stabilization. But Europeans should 
still strive toward helping local civilian and governance 
structures survive. 
Humanitarian aid, the provision of basic services, and 
support for civil society should also be the focus of European 
support in the PYD-controlled areas, where repression of 
opposition forces and independent activists and forced 
recruitment have become major problems, despite the 
progressive and inclusive image projected by the PYD.  
Last but not least, rather than thinking about sending 
refugees back to situations where their lives and existence are 
threatened, Europeans should focus more on building Syria’s 
human resources in the neighboring countries and among the 
refugee communities across Europe. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 An earlier version was published as Asseburg, M. / Oweis, K. Y. (2017). Syria’s 
Reconstruction Scramble. In a Game Fraught with Political Risk, Europe Should Aim for 
Long-term Stabilization. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2017. 
Retrieved from: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C51_ass_ows.pdf. 
2 See for example the maps of territorial control at Omran for Strategic Studies, 2017. 
3 Information provided in these paragraphs based on authors’ interviews with local activists. 
4 For an overview and analysis of some of these documents see Cordesman, 2017. 
 
 
 
                                                     
